Sharaa rebuilds Assad's parliament, but not as before
President Sharaa's announcement of his intention to form a new "People's Council" in Syria has drawn a cacophony of condemnations, since it was general disbelief at the goals of the project and speculation of an attempt to rebuild the very same system of authoritarianism that was prevalent during Assad's three-decade rule, but with a new face. One political commentator is certain that it is not a democratic transformation that is taking place, but a poorer imitation of authoritarianism.
The announcement of the president of the transitional government, Ahmed Sharaa, of his intention to form a new "People's Council" in Syria was received with an explosion of criticism and doubt over the political project intended to be formed by the transitional power.
Despite the rhetorical calls in official circles for a new time which shall witness the end of Bashar al-Assad's era, it is understood that what is presented today is nothing more than an attempt at reproducing the same tired authoritarian state but with a new face and with different names.
The outlines of the new parliament's make-up recall the old Ba'athist experience, where the president retains the power to appoint half of the members of the council (50 out of 150 deputies), thereby granting him the power to choose the authority for any vote in it.
This is seen as a quintessential product of the "National Progressive Front" ideology followed by the Assad regime for decades, which has transformed parliament into a rubber-stamp legislature for rubber-stamping the executive.
The seat allocation mechanism, computed from so-called "sub-electoral bodies," carries on pre-emptive regulation of the logic of the outcome too, allowing the regime to pre-screen candidates before they are exposed to the ballot box, just as they have already been determined in advance in concert with the security apparatus and the Ba'ath Party.
The transformation of the representative groups from "workers and peasants" to "notables and intellectuals" neither changes the fact that the council is non-pluralistic since it has no strong opposition parties and guarantees of representation to the forces that dominated the movement against the regime.
Although the council is formally vested with legislative authority, they are nonetheless bound by the president, whose jurisdiction includes the revocation of legislation and its blocking of passage without a two-thirds majority. Having a specific bloc behind him in the council, the presidential veto is employed as a tool to paralyze any proposal discontented with the palace.
Even what appears to be a constitutional reform measure—like granting immunity to parliamentarians or requiring a two-thirds majority to remove any member—become meaningless under a regime controlled by the president, with the remainder being concocted on the principles of security loyalty rather than people's representation.
Political and scholarly observer Ibrahim Muslim confirms this account, saying, "Yes, unfortunately, what we have today in Syria is a copy of an authoritarian regime, but with another color. True, the old regime was Baathist, nationalist, and controlled by a nucleus of the Alawite element, but it was made up of other elements under a formal umbrella. Today, we see that the current regime adheres to virtually the same aims, the brightest indications of which are its insistence on using the old name: the Syrian Arab Republic."
Muslim continues: "Since Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seized power and promptly held conferences such as the Victory Conference and the National Dialogue Conference for the sake of publicity, it became clear that the project is an imitation of the past regime, if not worse. When the transitional president grants himself the power to assign members of the People's Assembly and fills his entourage with opportunists who jump from one camp to another, the outcome is certain: a guaranteed majority that doesn't reflect the street."
He goes on: "He is president of the republic, prime minister, and commander of the armed forces, and he is answerable to no one. But he dominates parliament by appointment. Without real supervision and with the existence of symbolic elections, there will not be a transition towards democracy. Transition begins only where there are regions in the country that are independent of the central state, such as northeastern Syria and Jabal al-Arab, where there are Sunni, Alawite, and Christian elites who entertain a vision of a decentralized, secular, democratic state, but are presently excluded."
Muslim draws the conclusion that: "Under extended transitional rule and appointment periods that institutionalize dictatorship, it is impossible to talk of democracy except for broad international changes that shake the political map of the region and impose a new direction on Syria."
T/S
ANHA
Sharaa rebuilds Assad's parliament, but not as before
The announcement of the president of the transitional government, Ahmed Sharaa, of his intention to form a new "People's Council" in Syria was received with an explosion of criticism and doubt over the political project intended to be formed by the transitional power.
Despite the rhetorical calls in official circles for a new time which shall witness the end of Bashar al-Assad's era, it is understood that what is presented today is nothing more than an attempt at reproducing the same tired authoritarian state but with a new face and with different names.
The outlines of the new parliament's make-up recall the old Ba'athist experience, where the president retains the power to appoint half of the members of the council (50 out of 150 deputies), thereby granting him the power to choose the authority for any vote in it.
This is seen as a quintessential product of the "National Progressive Front" ideology followed by the Assad regime for decades, which has transformed parliament into a rubber-stamp legislature for rubber-stamping the executive.
The seat allocation mechanism, computed from so-called "sub-electoral bodies," carries on pre-emptive regulation of the logic of the outcome too, allowing the regime to pre-screen candidates before they are exposed to the ballot box, just as they have already been determined in advance in concert with the security apparatus and the Ba'ath Party.
The transformation of the representative groups from "workers and peasants" to "notables and intellectuals" neither changes the fact that the council is non-pluralistic since it has no strong opposition parties and guarantees of representation to the forces that dominated the movement against the regime.
Although the council is formally vested with legislative authority, they are nonetheless bound by the president, whose jurisdiction includes the revocation of legislation and its blocking of passage without a two-thirds majority. Having a specific bloc behind him in the council, the presidential veto is employed as a tool to paralyze any proposal discontented with the palace.
Even what appears to be a constitutional reform measure—like granting immunity to parliamentarians or requiring a two-thirds majority to remove any member—become meaningless under a regime controlled by the president, with the remainder being concocted on the principles of security loyalty rather than people's representation.
Political and scholarly observer Ibrahim Muslim confirms this account, saying, "Yes, unfortunately, what we have today in Syria is a copy of an authoritarian regime, but with another color. True, the old regime was Baathist, nationalist, and controlled by a nucleus of the Alawite element, but it was made up of other elements under a formal umbrella. Today, we see that the current regime adheres to virtually the same aims, the brightest indications of which are its insistence on using the old name: the Syrian Arab Republic."
Muslim continues: "Since Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seized power and promptly held conferences such as the Victory Conference and the National Dialogue Conference for the sake of publicity, it became clear that the project is an imitation of the past regime, if not worse. When the transitional president grants himself the power to assign members of the People's Assembly and fills his entourage with opportunists who jump from one camp to another, the outcome is certain: a guaranteed majority that doesn't reflect the street."
He goes on: "He is president of the republic, prime minister, and commander of the armed forces, and he is answerable to no one. But he dominates parliament by appointment. Without real supervision and with the existence of symbolic elections, there will not be a transition towards democracy. Transition begins only where there are regions in the country that are independent of the central state, such as northeastern Syria and Jabal al-Arab, where there are Sunni, Alawite, and Christian elites who entertain a vision of a decentralized, secular, democratic state, but are presently excluded."
Muslim draws the conclusion that: "Under extended transitional rule and appointment periods that institutionalize dictatorship, it is impossible to talk of democracy except for broad international changes that shake the political map of the region and impose a new direction on Syria."
T/S
ANHA
